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Abstract
Modigliani and Miller showed that the market value of the company is in-
dependent of its capital structure, and suggested that dividend policy makes
no difference to this law of one price. We experimentally test the MM theorem
in a complete market with two simultaneously traded assets, employing two
experimental treatment variations. The first variation involves the dividend
stream. According to this variation the dividend payout order is either identi-
cal or independent. The second variation involves the market participation, or
not, of an algorithmic arbitrageur. We find that Modigliani-Miller’s law of one
price can be supported on average with or without arbitrageur when dividends
are identical. The law of one price breaks down when dividend payout order
is independent unless the arbitrageur keeps the asset prices in balance.
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1 Introduction
We report an experimental test of the Modigliani-Miller value-invariance theorem of
capital structure and the sensitivity of the value-invariance proposition to dividend
payout variations. Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed by arbitrage proof with
perfectly correlated cash flows that the capital structure is irrelevant for the market
value of the firm. An early criticism of this law of one price was the challenging
question of market response to dividend payout decisions (Durand 1959, Modigliani
and Miller 1959). Real-world dividends are declared by the board of directors. A
remaining question is whether the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds if “man-made”
dividend policies are not perfectly correlated along with the underlying cash flows.
If value invariance breaks down with variations in dividend policies, the empirical
relevance of “the value-invariance proposition would seem to be narrow” (see Miller
1988, p. 103f).
The second Modigliani-Miller theorem, the dividend irrelevance theorem (Miller
and Modigliani 1961), was developed to address this question. The market valuation
depends on the firm’s dividends in the following way. The more the investor gets
in dividend payments, the less she gets in capital appreciation and vice versa. An
investor should be indifferent between dividend payouts and price appreciation, and
thus the value of the firm is independent of the dividend policy. Different from
the earlier contribution where arbitrage implies value-invariance, however, Miller
and Modigliani (1961) left open the question of how the market would approach
equilibration in the dividend irrelevance theorem. Empirical analyses of dividend-
payout policies suggest that dividend payouts are not independent of the market
value of the firm (Angelo and Angelo 2006; Asparouhova, Besliu and Lemmon 2016).
In this paper we propose another empirical test of the dividend irrelevance hy-
pothesis under controlled laboratory conditions. We test the law of one price in
the laboratory with two simultaneously traded assets, the cash flows of which are
perfectly correlated. The two assets pay four regular dividend amounts which are
known from the beginning, but the order of the dividend payouts is random. After
the last regular dividend payment each asset pays a random liquidation dividend.
It is a complete market setting. The liquidation dividends of the assets differ by a
constant amount; thus, the sum of cash flows are perfectly correlated.
We investigate two experimental treatment variations in a two-by-two design.
The first treatment condition varies the regular dividend streams prior to the liq-
uidation dividend. According to this variation the dividend order of the two assets
is identical or independent. When the order of dividends is identical, we have one
regular dividend draw without replacement for both assets in every period. When
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the order of dividends is independent, the regular dividends of the assets are inde-
pendent draws without replacement. We test the question whether the law of one
price holds with identical and with different dividend policies. The identical dividend
payout order implies a narrow test of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) value-invariance
theorem of the law of one price, whereas the independent dividend order implies a
test of the broader implication including the irrelevance of dividend payouts. Since
the difference between liquidation dividends is known with certainty and the sum of
remaining dividend payments is also known with certainty, any price discrepancies
offers an arbitrage opportunity. The second treatment condition varies the market
participation of an algorithmic arbitrageur. In one variation there is no algorithm,
and there is one in the other. Based on the potential price discrepancies in the
market we test the MM law of one price with and without arbitrageur.
According to our data, differences in dividend payouts impact market prices of
equivalent assets. Our data suggest that with an identical order of dividend payouts,
value-invariance can be supported on average. When the orders of dividend payouts
are independent, however, value-invariance seems to break down in absence of the
algorithmic arbitrageur. Only in presence of the algorithmic arbitrageur we can
support the MM law of one price on average if dividend payouts are independent.
Arbitrageurs help the market to reinstate the law of one price on average in our data.
That said, the result is on the average only. Throughout the experiment, arbitrage
opportunities do not completely disappear and, thus, pricing discrepancies between
the two assets remain. Hence, our data do not support the law of one price in real
time or on the level of average price in a period. This result occurs in all treatments
if the algorithmic arbitrageur is present or not. In this study we also look at the
pricing of assets relative to fundamental value. We find substantial deviations from
fundamental dividend values. The algorithmic arbitrageur seems to have no impact
on these deviations.
Our study contributes to the growing body of experimental work on financial
markets, in particular to the line of research that investigates the effects of algorith-
mic trading in markets and, on the other hand, to the research contributing to the
understanding of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and arbitrage. The experimental
finance literature on algorithmic trading includes approaches to randomized algo-
rithms (“zero intelligence traders” of Gode and Sunder 1993), behavioral aversion ef-
fects to trading with algorithms (Farjam and Kirchkamp 2017; Leal and Hanaki 2018;
Angerer, Neugebauer and Shachat 2019), efficiency of market institution and high
frequency trading (Aldrich and Lo´pez Vargas forthcoming), competitions of subject-
chosen algorithms (Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Rotaru, Wang, Yadav and Yang 2019),
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and, finally, arbitrage algorithms (Rietz 2005; Angerer et al 2019).1 The experimen-
tal literature on the Modigliani-Miller theorem of the law of one price includes studies
of single-asset pricing (Levati, Qiu and Mahganokar 2012) and pricing of perfectly
correlated twin assets (Asparouhova et al. 2016; Charness and Neugebauer 2019,
Angerer, Neugebauer and Shachat 2019). The latter studies are closely related to
ours.
Charness and Neugebauer (2019) show that Modigliani-Miller’s law of one price
holds on average in repeated experimental asset markets with a declining fundamen-
tal value when cash flows are perfectly correlated. Charness and Neugebauer study
an experimental asset market in which the dividends of the two shares are always
identical modulo a shift. The study confirms the law of one price on average despite
the fact that subjects do not exploit arbitrage opportunities as suggested in the un-
derlying theory (Modigliani and Miller 1958). On a more detailed level of analysis,
similar to our results, Charness and Neugebauer reject the law of one price on the
period level as they find that pricing discrepancies never disappear even in the re-
peated market setting. Angerer et al. (2019) study different arbitrageur strategies
with algorithms in the experimental design of Charness and Neugebauer. The study
shows that market quality vis-a`-vis the law of one price is clearly enhanced when an
arbitrageur acts in the market. On the period level, yet, the data in Angerer et al.
still suggest failure of the law of one price even when the arbitrageur is present, since
average prices deviate from parity.
Asparouhova et al. (2016) study a two-period design in which two assets pay the
same sum of dividends but in different timely orders. In their setting, and in contrast
to our design, they induce different preferences for cash and cash dividends between
investor subjects. Their data suggest that, possibly as a consequence of subjects’ cash
preferences, the asset that pays the early dividend is priced at a premium relative to
the asset that pays the late dividend. Thus, Asparouhova et al. reject the Modigliani-
Miller theorem. Similarly to Asparouhova et al. and different from Charness and
Neugebauer, and Angerer et al., the assets in our experimental design pay a fixed
sum of dividends plus a random liquidation payment. Similarly to Angerer et al.,
the presence of an arbitrageur algorithm is varied in one treatment condition of our
study. Different from these three studies, our second treatment condition varies
1Hence, we also contribute to the small body of experimental literature on arbitrage in markets
(O’Brien and Srivastava 1991; Abbink and Rockenbach 2006; Bossaerts, Shachat and Xie 2018).
Bossaerts et al. (2018) is an important reference for us, because our experimental design implements
a two-asset variation of their design. Their design involves a single asset that is traded for 5 periods
and that pays a dividend at the end of each period which is drawn without replacement from a set
of five known dividends.
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the complexity of dividend streams across the two assets. We find that Modigliani-
Miller’s law of one price can be supported on average with or without arbitrageur
when the same dividend policy is induced. When the dividend policy varies between
assets, however, the law of one price breaks down unless an algorithmic arbitrageur
helps to keep prices in balance.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting the experimental design
in the Section 2, before we briefly discuss the theory and the testable hypotheses in
Section 3. Section 4 reports the data, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experimental session is organized in six market sequences. Each market sequence
lasts for four periods involving one cohort of eight subjects; see the timeline of a
market sequence in Figure 1. At the beginning of the sequence, subjects are endowed
with 4,000 cash units and five shares of two assets from the same risk class. We refer
to these assets as “the L-share” and “the U-share”, respectively.2 At the end of the
period, each asset pays a cash dividend from the set of -50, -50, +50, +50 cash units.
The cash dividends are drawn without replacement, so that exactly two dividend
payments are positive and the other two are negative. Dividend payments are added
to the subject’s cash balance, and shares and cash carry over to the next period.
At the end of period 4, after four dividend payments, subjects receive a liquidation
payment for each share. The liquidation payment of the L-share is either 100 or
300 cash units, both outcomes being equally likely. The liquidation payments are
perfectly correlated; the liquidation payment of the U-share is 200 cash units higher
than the one of the A-share. Following the liquidation payment, the subject’s final
cash balance is determined, and shares are cancelled. One of the six sequences is
decisive for payment. Subjects are informed at the end of the session about the
decisive sequence. Their final payment is equivalent to the final cash balance in the
decisive sequence plus a lump-sum for participation.
It is crucial to note that the sum of regular dividends for each share is zero,
and the sum of remaining dividends, which varies from period to period, is known
with certainty for each asset always. The expected liquidation payment of the two
shares differs by a constant, i.e., 200 cash units. Accounting for differences in the
sum of remaining dividends and the liquidation payment differential, thus, any price
discrepancies offer arbitrage opportunities, i.e., immediate riskless profits by selling
2With the L, U notation we refer to “levered” and “unlevered” equity. In the experiment,
however, we refer to the A-share and the B-share, respectively.
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Figure 1: Timeline of experimental market sequence
high and buying low.
In each period, the market opens where the two assets can be traded in a con-
tinuous double auction. Subjects submit limit orders (i.e., bids and asks) or accept
outstanding limit orders to close a transaction. Limit orders can be cancelled. Short
sales and purchases on loan are enabled; the minimum cash balance is -3,000 cash
units and the minimum holding of L-share and U-share is -5 each. Trading is free of
submission and transaction fees and interest rate and short sale fees are zero. The
trading time per period is three minutes in the first two market sequences and two
minutes per period thereafter. During the market period subjects observe in real
time the bids and asks in open order books and the market prices, including high,
low, average and opening prices. The received dividends and the remaining dividends
are announced throughout the sequence. Subjects see their cash balance, their share
holdings, they have a record of all their transactions, dividend incomes during the
market sequence.
Table 1: Treatment conditions and treatment names
Algorithm participation
Dividend streams No algorithm Arbitrage algorithm
Identical dividends OneUrn/NoBot OneUrn/Bot
Independent dividends TwoUrn/NoBot TwoUrn/Bot
The experiment varies two treatment conditions in a 2x2 design; see Table 1. The
treatments differ with respect to the dividend sequence (one-urn or two-urn variation)
and the participation of the algorithm in the market (no-bot or bot variation). If
the dividend sequence of the two assets is identical (i.e., the one-urn condition), the
dividends of the A-share and the B-share are the same in each period. If the sequences
are independent (i.e., the two-urn condition), the sequence of dividends are drawn
independently for the L-share and U-share. When the algorithm participates (i.e.,
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the bot condition), every arbitrage opportunity is instantaneously and automatically
exploited in real-time upon submission (equivalent to the fast bot in Angerer et al.
2019). In all treatments we announce the possible participation of the algorithm,
but we provide no information on the actual participation and on the the strategy
of the algorithm to the experimental subjects.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory.
In each session, some cohorts were exposed to the arbitrage algorithm while other co-
horts were not. The written instructions, which were tape recorded and played back,
referred to the potential participation of the algorithm.3 Each subject participated
in exactly one cohort of eight in exactly one experimental treatment. After having
read the instructions, subjects interacted within their cohort in a practice session of
three minutes. During the practice session, which never involved the participation of
the algorithm, no interaction had any payoff consequence. The dividend sequences,
liquidation values and payment decisive sequence were pre-drawn at once for all 32
cohorts on an spread-sheet and introduced into the software. The pre-drawing pro-
cedure was explained to subjects in the instructions. The pre-drawn random values
were recorded on paper, put into an envelope placed at the wall of the laboratory.
After the last sequence of the experiment, the envelope was opened and the pre-
recorded values were announced to subjects. Subjects could compare these values
with the once of their experiment which were recorded on their computer screen.
Thus, subjects were able to see that the instructor could not influence their personal
payments. At the end of the experiment we debriefed subjects in a questionnaire, in
which we collected socio-demographic data.
The experiment was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). For the re-
cruitment of subjects we used ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The experimental sessions
were conducted in the laboratory LEE at the University of Castellon in Spain. Our
experiment consisted of thirty-two cohorts of eight subjects each. Exactly eight co-
horts were randomly assigned to each of our four experimental treatment conditions.
3Farjam and Kirchkamp (2017) suggest that such announcement alone can lead to more effi-
cient market prices. The potential participation of an algorithm could thus bias our data towards
efficiency. However, one should note that Leal and Hanaki (2018) and Angerer, Neugebauer and
Shachat (2019) found no announcement effect in market prices.
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3 Theoretical consideration, measures and testable
hypotheses
3.1 Theoretical considerations
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the market value of the corporation is
invariant to its capital structure. Let VU ≡ SU denote the market value of unlevered
equity of the company. Let VL denote the market value of the levered company
including the value of levered equity, SL, and the (constant) market value of bonds,
B. According to the Modigliani-Miller value-invariance theorem (without taxes), the
market value of the company with or without debt is the same.
VU ≡ SU = SL +B ≡ VL (1)
The crucial point of the arbitrage proof of the MM invariance theorem is that if
the value of levered equity and the value of unlevered equity differ by more or less
than the debt, the arbitrageur will sell the high-priced and buy the low-priced share
of equity and make an arbitrage gain. In the (no-arbitrage) equilibrium, thus, the
market value of levered equity and the market value of unlevered equity must differ
by the value of bonds, i.e., SU − SL = B.
How does our experimental design map into the Modigliani-Miller world? In the
experiment we assume a constant “synthetic value of debt” which can be thought of
as being represented by the constant difference in liquidation payments of the L-share
and U-share. In our setting, possible differences in the sum of remaining dividends
add to or subtract from the differences in liquidation payments. We denote the sum
of remaining dividend payments of L-share and U-share explicitly by DL and DU , and
RL and RU are the market values of the liquidation payments, where SL ≡ RL +DL
and SU ≡ RU +DU . Thus, value invariance in our experiment implies the following
equation.
VU ≡ RU +DU = RU +DU +B ≡ VL (2)
Equation (2) must be fulfilled in the no-arbitrage equilibrium, even with varying,
independent dividend payouts. This equation is the starting point for our experi-
mental tests.
3.2 Measures
In our analysis we apply (besides the measure of arbitrage value in real time) also the
measures proposed in Charness and Neugebauer (2019). So, we measure deviations
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from the law of one price between the L-share and the U-share by the deviations from
parity pricing (DPP). The measure is similar to the one formulated in Charness and
Neugebauer (2019), where the time index indicates the period t = 1, 2, 3, 4, i.e.,
DPPt =
SU,t
SL,t +B
− 1 = (SU,t − SL,t)−∆FVt
SL,t + ∆FVt
(3)
∆FVt ≡ FVU,t − FVL,t is the difference in remaining payouts between shares,
where FVL,t and FVU,t denote the sum of remaining dividends plus expected liquida-
tion payment of L-share and U-share, respectively. We measure the average deviation
from parity pricing per period over the course of one market sequence as follows.
DPP =
1
T
T∑
t=1
DPPt (4)
Deviations from parity pricing can average zero, although deviations from parity
pricing always exist. Therefore, we measure the average absolute deviation from
parity pricing (ADPP) between the L-share and U-share as follows.
ADPP =
1
T
∑
|DPPt| (5)
ADPP denotes the average absolute deviation from parity pricing during the
course of a market sequence. If average prices in a period equal dividend value, or if
the average prices differ by dividend value the ADPP measure is zero. Indeed even
with zero ADPP measure, average prices can deviate from fundamental dividend
values.
Even if ADPP = 0, it can be that many arbitrage opportunities arise in the
course of trading. Therefore, we measure (potential) arbitrage opportunities in two
ways. First, we count the number of limit orders that lead to arbitrage opportunities
(discrepant limit order flow, DLOF) as well as the total number of limit orders (limit
order flow, LOF) in each market sequence. Thus, the ratio DLOF/LOF measures
the proportion of limit orders that generate arbitrage opportunities (Charness and
Neugebauer 2019). As second measure we compute the size of the (potential) ar-
bitrage gains in real time, pi. When the arbitrage algorithm is (not) present, the
arbitrage values equal the (potential) gains of the arbitrageur.
pit =
∑
τ
max(0, bL,τ − oU,τ + ∆FVt) +max(0, bU,τ − oL,τ −∆FVt), (6)
where τ denotes time within period t, b·,τ and o·,τ denote the best outstanding limit
order bid and offer at time τ in the L-share and the U-share, respectively.
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We measure the deviations from fundamental dividend values in two ways. First,
we measure the expected excess return of buying and selling off the fundamental
dividend value including the expected liquidation payment at the end of market
sequence (j = 1, 2 indicates L-share and U-share, J = 2):
DFj,t =
Sj,t
FVj,t
− 1; (7)
DF is the relative deviation from fundamentals and ADF is the absolute relative
deviation from fundamentals over the course of the market sequence:
DFt =
1
J
J∑
j=1
DFj,t; DF =
1
T
T∑
t=1
DFt (8)
ADFt =
1
J
J∑
j=1
|DFj,t|; ADF = 1
T
T∑
t=1
ADFt (9)
ADF can be compared to ADPP. If ADF exceeds ADPP then we have that the
price trajectories converge on parity rather than on fundamental payout values, and
vice versa. As second set of measure we use the relative deviation, RD, and the
relative absolute deviation, RAD, which has been applied as mispricing measure vis-
a`-vis fundamentals in single-asset market experiments (e.g., Sto¨ckl, Huber, Kirchler
2010).
RDj =
1
TFVj
T∑
t=1
Sj,t − FVj,t (10)
RADj =
1
TFVj
T∑
t=1
|Sj,t − FVj,t| (11)
Since L-share and U-share trade at the same time, we define the average of the
individual asset measures as the relative deviation RD = 0.5(RDL + RDU) and
relative absolute deviation, RAD = 0.5(RADL +RADU).
3.3 Testable research questions
The Modigliani-Miller theorem implies the following testable hypotheses: DPP = 0,
ADPP = 0, pi = 0. In fact, it would also be sufficient for the confirmation of the MM
theorem, if asset prices would always confirm fundamentals, that is, ADF = 0 and
RADL = 0 = RADU . The test of the MM theorem in our experimental environment
is our main research question. More detailed testable research questions follow:
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1. Are relative prices in equilibrium when dividends are identical?
2. Are relative prices in equilibrium when dividends are different?
3. Does our algorithmic arbitrageur help to establish the law of one price when
dividends are different or identical?
4. Do we observe mispricing vis-a-vis the fundamental value? Does it get worse
when dividends are different rather than when they are identical?
5. Does mispricing seize with experience of subjects?
6. Does our algorithmic arbitrageur help to eliminate mispricing?
7. Does our algorithmic arbitrageur affect market liquidity, volume and volatility?
8. Does our algorithmic arbitrageur impact a price movement towards fundamen-
tals?
4 Results
The data of one cohort represent one independent observation, such that we have 32
independent observations in total. Overall, 256 subjects participated in the study,
of which 47 percent were female. On average, subjects stated risk aversion on a
7-point Likert scale was 3.59 (indicating risk neutrality). An overview of our data
preliminaries is presented by Table 2. We have organized this section in three sub-
sections. In each subsection we present our observations including the supportive
data analysis.
4.1 Law of one price
Our first test of the Modigliani-Miller theorem of the law of one price is based on
the deviations from parity pricing, DPP (Equation 4). The measured average devi-
ations from parity are reported in Table 3, organized chronologically by market and
treatment. The test results are indicated.
Observation I (Parity pricing): Parity pricing cannot be rejected in three
out of four treatments. Only in the TwoUrn/NoBot treatment with no participation
of the algorithmic arbitrageur, the law of one price must be rejected.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics Average values of relative deviations from price
parity, DPP, absolute deviations from price parity, ADPP, relative deviations from
fundamental values, DF, absolute deviations from fundamental values, ADF, (po-
tential) arbitrage gains, pi, and average-subject characteristics stated in the ques-
tionnaire, organized by treatment condition. (Standard deviations are reported in
parentheses).
OneUrn TwoUrn
Bot (n=8) NoBot (n=8) Bot (n=8) NoBot (n=8)
DPP 0.015 0.112 -0.013 -0.037
(0.165) (0.375) (0.168) (0.197)
ADPP 0.123 0.204 0.128 0.149
(0.081) (0.220) (0.079) (0.083)
DF -0.130 -0.027 -0.105 0.002
(0.159) (0.239) (0.230) (0.174)
ADF 0.223 0.242 0.250 0.202
(0.096) (0.139) (0.131) (0.108)
pi 125 362 135 364
(198) (844) (211) (554)
Average CRT score 1.16a 0.75a 0.875 0.656
(0.420)a (0.199)a (0.381) (0.353)
Average risk seeking 3.31 3.75 3.64 3.67
(0.456) (0.678) (0.572) (0.623)
Average female ratio 0.453 0.453 0.531 0.438
(0.234) (0.107) (0.241) (0.166)
aThese values are based on 4 instead of 8 cohorts.
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Table 3: Deviations from parity pricing - descriptive statistics. Average
relative deviation from parity pricing, DPP, by market and treatment condition in
columns (1)-(2), and (4)-(5). Columns (3) and (6) report p-values for Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests; (z-statistics for one-sample and two-sample tests are reported
in parentheses).
OneUrn TwoUrn
Run Bot NoBot Bot vs. NoBot Bot NoBot Bot vs. NoBot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market 1 -0.01 0.12 0.74 -0.04 -0.06∗∗ 0.46
(-0.69) (-0.17) (-0.33) (-1.35) (-2.17) (0.73)
Market 2 0.02 0.14 0.48 -0.02 -0.06 0.76
(0.36) (1.48) (-0.71) (-1.09) (-1.39) (0.31)
Market 3 0.04 0.11 0.77 -0.03 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.14
(1.02) (1.31) (-0.30) (-0.81) (-2.71) (1.47)
Market 4 0.01 0.08 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.58
(0.77) (1.75) (-1.09) (-0.37) (0.48) (-0.55)
Market 5 0.02 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗ -0.03 -0.05∗∗ 0.34
(1.23) (3.26) (-1.89) (-1.31) (-1.98) (0.96)
Market 6 0.00 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.04 0.02 0.83
(0.33) (2.63) (-1.82) (0.89) (0.57) (0.21)
Average 0.02 0.11 0.39 -0.01 -0.04∗∗ 0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (-1.00) (-2.00) (0.86)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Support: Table 3 reports average relative deviations from parity pricing, DPP,
by Market, sequence 1 to 6, for all treatments. Values for DPP are derived as
formulated in Equation 3. The average results are shown in the bottom line of the
table, see also Table 2. Table 3 indicates that average pricing in the TwoUrn/NoBot
treatment, see column (5) of the table, differs from parity significantly. As indicated
in the table, some deviations from parity pricing are also indicated in some markets
of the OneUrn/NoBot treatment without algorithmic arbitrageur participation. We
find no significant deviation from parity pricing in any market where the algorithmic
arbitrageur participates.
Observation 1 adds to the supportive evidence of the Modigliani-Miller theorem,
but also shows its limitations. Charness and Neugebauer (2019) found that the dif-
ferences from parity pricing are not significantly different from zero, when dividends
are equal modulo a shift. It seems that we have been able to reproduce this effect in
the OneUrn treatment condition, where dividend streams for L-shares and U-shares
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Figure 2: Average relative deviation from parity pricing (DPP) by treatment
are identical and the differences in the liquidation payments are constant. This result
is perhaps not so surprising. For the TwoUrn treatment condition, where dividend
streams for L-shares and U-shares are independent, differences from parity pricing
are significant on average, unless the algorithmic arbitrageur is present. So what does
that tell us about the claim of Miller and Modigliani (1961) that the market value
of the firm is independent of its payout policy? Apparently, the Modigliani-Miller
law of one price is impacted by differences in the payout policy. This observation,
maybe for different reasons or not, underlines the empirical evidence on the relevance
of dividend payout policy (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2006, Asparouhova et al. 2016).
To support the law of one price with different dividends, we need an algorithmic
arbitrageur in the market. In the TwoUrn/Bot treatment, differences from parity
are not significant. The impact of the algorithm on parity pricing is also shown in
Figure 2 by period, aggregated over all six markets.
Figure 2 shows the differences from parity pricing, DPPt, by period and treat-
ment. (See also Figure 5 in the appendix where the average differences from parity
are shown for each dividend pattern of the L-share). The Figure shows that markets
in the OneUrn treatment condition, i.e., with identical dividend streams for L-shares
and U-shares, appear to reach parity pricing (y=0, dotted line) when the algorithmic
arbitrageur is present (solid black line) but deviate from parity pricing where no al-
gorithm is present (dashed black line). Similarly in the TwoUrn treatment condition,
the average prices are closer to parity pricing in the presence of the algorithm. In
the NoBot treatment condition (dashed red line), prices are further away from parity
pricing than in the Bot markets (solid red line). We now turn to a more demanding
test of the Modigliani-Miller law of one price, via the absolute deviations from parity
pricing, ADPP.
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Table 4: Deviations from parity pricing - regression results. Results from
OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Average relative deviation from price
parity, DPP, and average absolute deviation from price parity, ADPP, are derived
as defined in Equations 4 and 5. Bot and TwoUrn are treatment dummies. Market
indicates the market sequence, ranging from 1 to 6. avRisk is the average self-
reported willingness to take risks on a 7-point Likert scale for each cohort. avFemale
is the proportion of female participants within a respective cohort. avCRT is the
average score in a standard CRT test for each cohort, CRT-scores range from 0 to 3
according to the number of correct answers. The mean has been subtracted from the
last three measures to allow for a more meaningful interpretation of the intercept.
Dependent variable:
DPP ADPP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.068 −0.021 −0.104 0.254∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.055) (0.068) (0.038) (0.044) (0.042)
Bot −0.039 −0.026 0.022 −0.052∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014)
TwoUrn −0.089∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.025 −0.030 0.0005
(0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)
Market 0.005 0.005 0.008 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
avRisk 0.037∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.012 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011)
avFemale −0.109∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ −0.060
(0.039) (0.063) (0.027) (0.040)
avCRT 0.016 −0.109∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.024)
Observations 192 192 144 192 192 144
R2 0.081 0.103 0.141 0.102 0.141 0.251
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.079 0.103 0.088 0.117 0.218
F Statistic 5.488∗∗∗ 4.279∗∗∗ 3.751∗∗∗ 7.109∗∗∗ 6.085∗∗∗ 7.649∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Observation II (Absolute Deviation from Parity Pricing): ADPP
measures are significantly positive for all markets and treatment conditions. ADPP
measures are significantly smaller in the presence of the algorithmic arbitrageur, and
diminish with experience.
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Support: Table 2 records average ADPP measures by treatment sequence, rang-
ing from 0.123 to 0.204. Table 4 reports regression results with and without control
variables. We estimate the impact of our treatment conditions using OLS regres-
sion with robust standard errors, clustered at cohort level. The regressions show
that ADPP is significantly smaller when the algorithmic arbitrageur is present than
when it is not. The regression results further show that the pricing discrepancies
get smaller with repetition, indicated by Market. Table 4 also suggest that absolute
deviation from parity pricing are smaller in cohorts with higher average CRT-scores.
Observation III (Potential arbitrage gains): The (potential) arbitrage
gains are smaller when the algorithmic arbitrageur is present. Repetition and market
acuity leads to a reduction in discrepant orders.
Support: Table 2 shows the (potential) gains from arbitrage pi per market for
each treatment. The regression results in Table 5 show that the potential arbitrage
gains are significantly smaller in treatments with algorithmic arbitrageur than with-
out. The main reason is probably that discrepant limit orders remain outstanding
in the market for longer and thus trigger more discrepant limit orders subsequently
through competition. Interestingly, the (potential) arbitrage gains seem independent
of the treatment condition; it only matters if an arbitrageur is present or not. The
regression in Table 5 shows that the repetition, Market, and the CRT-score of the
market have a negative impact on (potential) arbitrage gains. The regression results
of the number of discrepant limit orders do not suggest that the relative frequency
of discrepant limit orders diminishes. Apparently, arbitrage opportunities diminish
in size but not its relative frequency.
4.2 Expected dividend value
We are also interested in the determinants of market prices, in particular, in the
impact of the algorithmic arbitrageur on asset prices relative to fundamentals. The
traditional view on Wall Street is that the activity of well-paid professions who en-
gage in arbitrage pushes prices towards fundamentals. As described in section 3,
we have different measures of mispricing vis-a`-vis fundamentals; DF, ADF, RD and
RAD.
Observation IV (Deviation from fundamentals) The presence of the al-
gorithmic arbitrageur does not facilitate convergence of market prices towards fun-
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Table 5: Arbitrage opportunities. Results from OLS regressions with robust
standard errors. The cumulative value of potential arbitrage gains pi per market
sequence and the proportion of discrepant limit orders (DLOF ) of total limit orders
(LOF ) in percent are measured as defined in Equation 6. Bot and TwoUrn are
treatment dummies. Market indicates the market sequence, ranging from 1 to 6.
avRisk is the average self-reported willingness to take risks on a 7-point Likert scale
for each cohort. avFemale is the proportion of female participants within a cohort.
avCRT is the average score in a standard CRT test within a cohort. The mean
has been subtracted from the last three measures to allow for a more meaningful
interpretation of the intercept.
Dependent variable:∑
pit DLOF/LOF (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 627.748∗∗∗ 660.789∗∗∗ 924.434∗∗ 4.056∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗ 5.568∗
(177.973) (247.986) (363.267) (0.705) (1.998) (2.847)
Bot −233.177∗∗∗ −261.482∗∗∗ −96.071 −2.088∗∗∗ −2.096∗∗∗ −1.902∗∗∗
(73.968) (77.694) (60.923) (0.480) (0.478) (0.612)
TwoUrn 6.281 1.603 58.100 0.732 0.761 0.802
(73.968) (78.029) (55.304) (0.480) (0.505) (0.671)
Market −76.563∗∗∗ −76.563∗∗∗ −50.545∗∗∗ −0.193 −0.193 −0.157
(27.640) (27.433) (18.472) (0.138) (0.138) (0.169)
avRisk −50.458 −34.406 −0.120 0.125
(70.936) (65.282) (0.637) (0.691)
avFemale 351.539∗∗ −230.079 −0.440 −2.807
(147.937) (232.353) (1.390) (2.373)
avCRT −353.804∗∗∗ −1.174
(133.985) (1.219)
Observations 192 192 144 192 192 144
R2 0.107 0.122 0.200 0.110 0.111 0.133
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.099 0.165 0.096 0.087 0.095
F Statistic 7.482∗∗∗ 5.179∗∗∗ 5.708∗∗∗ 7.724∗∗∗ 4.647∗∗∗ 3.497∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6: Deviation from fundamental values Results from OLS regressions with
clustered standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Absolute
and relative deviation from fundamental dividend values per period, ADFt and DFt,
as defined in Equations 8 and 9. Bot and TwoUrn are treatment dummies. Market
indicates the market sequence, ranging from 1 to 6. The cash/asset ratio is defined
as the ratio between all available cash and the fundamental value of all outstanding
shares. avRisk is the average self-reported willingness to take risks on a 7-point
Likert scale for each cohort. avFemale is the proportion of female participants within
a cohort. avCRT is the average score in a standard CRT test within a cohort. The
mean has been subtracted from the last four measures to allow for a more meaningful
interpretation of the intercept.
Dependent variable:
ADFt DFt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.265∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.265∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.031) (0.046) (0.028) (0.048) (0.071)
Bot 0.017 −0.003 0.025∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022)
TwoUrn −0.004 −0.007 −0.014 0.027 0.026 0.094∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
Market −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.002 −0.008 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Cash/asset ratio 0.027 0.057∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.045)
avRisk −0.037∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
avFemale 0.228∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗
(0.025) (0.044) (0.039) (0.070)
avCRT −0.014 0.020
(0.027) (0.038)
Observations 735 735 549 735 735 549
R2 0.019 0.094 0.140 0.040 0.165 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.086 0.128 0.036 0.158 0.158
F Statistic 4.788∗∗∗ 12.554∗∗∗ 12.535∗∗∗ 10.171∗∗∗ 23.986∗∗∗ 15.739∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Measures of market liquidity - regression results. Results from
OLS regressions with clustered standard errors. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. volt is the total number of shares traded per period. Spreadt is the
average percentage spread between the median best ask and median best bid per
period. Bot and TwoUrn are treatment dummies. Market indicates the market
sequence, ranging from 1 to 6. The cash/asset ratio is defined as the ratio between
all available cash and the fundamental value of all outstanding shares. avRisk is
the average self-reported willingness to take risks on a 7-point Likert scale for each
cohort. avFemale is the proportion of female participants within a cohort. avCRT
is the average score in a standard CRT test within a cohort. The mean has been
subtracted from the last four measures to allow for a more meaningful interpretation
of the intercept.
Dependent variable:
Volt Spreadt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 16.777∗∗∗ 6.389∗∗ 13.085∗∗∗ 0.470 0.436∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(1.018) (2.922) (3.470) (1.018) (0.019) (0.029)
Bot 4.562∗∗∗ 4.815∗∗∗ 7.293∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.020∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.728) (0.709) (1.276) (0.728) (0.006) (0.009)
TwoUrn −0.021 −0.422 −0.816 −0.022 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.728) (0.693) (0.827) (0.728) (0.006) (0.008)
Market −1.341∗∗∗ −1.413∗∗∗ −1.414∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.001 −0.003
(0.232) (0.227) (0.278) (0.232) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash/asset ratio 3.507∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(1.197) (1.534) (0.013) (0.016)
avRisk 2.279∗∗∗ 4.662∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.009
(0.778) (0.861) (0.005) (0.006)
avFemale 5.387∗∗∗ −10.249∗∗∗ 0.033∗ −0.020
(1.905) (3.183) (0.018) (0.028)
avCRT −11.329∗∗∗ −0.024
(2.045) (0.016)
Observations 768 768 576 768 768 576
R2 0.094 0.133 0.179 0.019 0.450 0.429
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.127 0.169 0.015 0.445 0.422
F Statistic 26.310∗∗∗ 19.528∗∗∗ 17.741∗∗∗ 4.915∗∗∗ 103.621∗∗∗ 60.967∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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damental values.
Support: Table 2 exhibits average measures of DF, ADF, RD and RAD. Note-
worthy, the ADF measures are larger than the ADPP measure in every treatment,
indicating that prices rather converge on parity than on fundamentals. Table 6 shows
regression results with DF, ADF and Table 8 in appendix B shows regression results
with RAD and RD as response variables. Table 6 indicates no treatment effect on the
ADF measure, see columns (1)-(3). A significant determinant of the ADF measure
seems to be repetition; in later market sequences the ADF measure is smaller. The
cohort’s average risk aversion and its female share seem to have an opposing effect.
If the algorithm has an effect on ADF, then it is an increasing effect as suggested in
column (3) of Table 6. It seems that the algorithmic arbitrageur in our design rather
impacts a lower price level than moving towards fundamentals, see columns (4)-(6).
The cohort’s average risk aversion and its female share seem to have an opposing
effect. Similarly, the cohort’s average risk aversion and its female share seem to have
a negative price impact, see columns (5)-(6). Table 8 in appendix B confirms these
effects for the market sequence level on the basis of RD and RAD measures.
4.3 Algorithmic trading and market quality
In this section we summarize and address the effects of the algorithm in our data.
In the above observations, we have seen that the algorithmic arbitrageur amends
deviations from the law of one price. In particular, we found no market with partic-
ipation of the algorithm in which the deviations from parity pricing were significant.
In sharp contrast we found in absence of the algorithm that in the TwoUrn condition
the deviations from the law of one price are significant on average. We have reported
that algorithm participation reduces the price discrepancies in size and quantity,
both in real time and on period averages. Nonetheless, the absolute price deviations
from fundamentals were not impacted. Further impacts on market quality of the
algorithmic arbitrageur are described in the following.
Observation V (Trading Volume): The number of limit orders is not neg-
atively impacted and the number of transactions is significantly larger when the
algorithm is present.
Support: Table 7 exhibits the regression results of the determinants of the num-
ber of transactions in our markets. The average number of limit orders per period
is 56 when the algorithm is present in the market and 51 when it is not. Hence,
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the presence of the algorithm rather increases than decreases the number of limit
orders. As indicated in Table 7, the number of transactions is significantly larger
when the algorithmic arbitrager is present, i.e., by about two units per period. Fi-
nally, repetition has a negative impact on the number of transactions in our markets.
Observation VI (Cash/Asset ratio) Price level and transaction volume pos-
itively correlate with the cash amount in the market.
Support: Table 6 shows the price relative to fundamentals, and Table 7 shows
the number of transactions. In both regressions we report the cash/asset ratio as
explanatory variable. The cash/asset ratio is significant in these regressions. The
higher price level suggests that after a positive dividend payment, when we have a
higher cash/asset ratio and a decrease in fundamental value, prices are high relative
to fundamentals, and vice versa. This effect can be impacted by price inertia, i.e.,
when investors’ price adjustments are too conservative re fundamentals.
5 Conclusion
We have reported experimental data on the question whether the Modigliani-Miller
law of one price is impacted by differences in dividend payouts. On the basis of our
data analysis the following conclusions seem to be justified. We have weakly positive
support for the law of one price, but find important limitations.
The average prices of our leveraged and unleveraged assets are not significantly
different from another when dividends are identical. When dividends are identical,
we cannot reject parity pricing on the overall data. However, when dividends are
independent, parity pricing can be supported only if an algorithm exploits the ar-
bitrage opportunities in the market and thus pushes prices to parity. This result is
quite interesting. It suggests that when the differences in fundamental values get cog-
nitively more demanding, then the law of one price can break down. It also suggests
that an arbitrageur in the market can help to support the law of one price. That
result appears to us also interesting, because it explains what kind of market forces
are required at a minimum to support this important theoretical result of Miller and
Modigliani (1961) on the irrelevance of dividend policy for market valuation.
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Appendix
A Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment on decision-making in
asset markets. If you read these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you
might earn a considerable amount of money. This money will be paid to you in
cash after the session. Do not use hand phones, laptop computers, or use the lab’s
desktop computer except for the experimental software application. Please refrain
from talking for the duration of the experiment, or looking at others’ computer
monitors. If at some point you have a question, please raise your hand and we will
address it as soon as possible. You must observe these rules, otherwise we will have
to exclude you from this experiment and all associated payments, and ask you to
leave.
A.1 Shares, cash, and earnings
In this experiment, you will participate in a market of 8 participants. The identities
of the other market participants will not be revealed to you. You will interact with
the same participants in 6 successive rounds of 4 periods.
At the beginning of each round we give each participant the following: 4000 units
of cash, 5 “A”-type shares, and 5 “B”-type shares. Every single share generates a
cash payment at the end of each trading period. This payment is called “dividend”.
A dividend will be +50 or -50 cash units. When dividends are paid on shares you hold
the amount is added to, or subtracted, from your cash balance. After 4 dividends
are paid, at the end of the round shareholders receive a liquidation payment on all
shares, and shares are cancelled thereafter. Liquidation payments are added to a
shareholder’s cash balance.
You will end each round with a final cash balance. The final cash balance is the
basis for your final earnings in this experiment. The timeline of the round is shown
in Figure 3.
————————————————————————————————————
—–
Participants in the One Urn Treatment Condition read:
How dividends are determined:
We announce and pay dividends at the conclusion of each period. The A and B
share dividends are always equal.
Within a round, for exactly two periods the dividend will be +50, and for exactly
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Figure 3: Timeline of the round
two periods the dividend will be -50 cash units. However, the order of the four
dividends is random.
The dividend process can be thought of as follows. There is an opaque urn
containing two balls marked with the symbol “+”, representing +50 dividends each,
and two balls marked with the symbol “-”, -50 dividends. After the first trading
period one of the balls is randomly selected to determine the period one dividend.
This ball is discarded, not returned to the urn. This selection is repeated for the
next three periods until all of the balls have been selected after trading period four
and no balls are left in the urn.
——
Participants in the Two Urn Treatment Condition read:
How dividends are determined:
We announce and pay dividends at the conclusion of each period. The A and B
share dividends may differ or be equal for a given period.
For a given share type and within a round, for exactly two periods the dividend
will be +50, and for exactly two periods the dividend will be -50 cash units. However,
the order of the four dividends is random. The order of the A share dividends and
the order of the B share dividends are also independent.
The dividend process can be thought of as follows. There are two opaque urns,
one for A shares and the other for B shares. The two urns both contain two balls
labelled with a “+”, representing +50 dividends, and balls labelled with a “–“, -50
dividends each. After the first trading period one of the balls is randomly selected
from the A share urn to determine the A share dividend of period 1. This ball is
discarded, not returned to the urn. We do the same with the other urn, randomly
select a ball from the B share urn to determine the B share dividend of that period.
These selections are repeated for the next three periods until all of the balls have been
selected from both urns after trading period 4 and no balls are left in the urns. —
————————————————————————————————————–
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How liquidation payments are determined:
The liquidation payment is random. The liquidation payment per A share will be
either 100 or 300 cash units; each having an equal chance of selection. The liquidation
payment per B share will be exactly 200 cash units more than the one per A share.
When the liquidation payment of the A share is 100, then the liquidation payment
of the B share will be 300 cash units. Likewise, when the liquidation payment of the
A share is 300, the liquidation payment of the B share will be 500 cash units.
We have used separate coin tosses to determine the liquidation payments for
the six rounds before the session. Also prior to the session, we have pre-drawn
the dividend series for all trading periods. We have recorded these dividend and
liquidation outcomes on paper and placed them in an envelope taped on the wall of
the room. At the end of the experiment, we will open the relevant envelopes and
project the recorded values for all to see they match those in the experiment. Note
that any actions taken in the experiment can not influence these values.
A.2 How to trade shares?
The experiment is divided into six rounds of 4 consecutive trading Periods. Each
trading period in the first two rounds will last 180 seconds, and 120 seconds in the
later rounds. In each trading period, you will participate in a market where the
Shares can be bought and sold between participants. You pay out of your Cash
when you buy a share, and you get Cash when you sell a share. When a period is
over, your Cash and Shares will carry over to the next period until the round ends.
We are interested in the price you are bidding to pay and the price you are asking
to sell. In order to buy shares, you need cash. If you run out of Cash, you can borrow
cash (with no interest) up to 3000 cash units. The cash you own is shown on the
screen. If you borrow Cash, your Cash holdings will be negative. In order to sell
shares, you need shares. The number of shares you own is indicated at the top of
your screen for “A” shares and “B” shares, respectively. If you do not own (enough)
shares and wish to sell (more) shares, you can borrow to sell up to 5 “A” shares AND
up to 5 “B” shares. If you sell more shares than you own your share holdings will be
negative. For a given negative share count at the end of the period, the dividend on
these negative shares will be subtracted from your cash, i.e., positive dividends will
be subtracted and negative dividends will be added. At the end of the round, the
liquidation payment for a given negative share count will be subtracted from your
cash balance.
During a period, you may buy or sell shares (see Figure 2 on the next page, and
at the end of the Instructions). You can also choose not to trade any shares and
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simply wait and collect dividends. Note that you can only buy or sell one share at a
time.
1. Submit an ASK: An ask is a proposed selling price for one share. You offer
a share from your share holdings for sale by entering the asking price to sell
one share in the space underneath the button ASK: proposed selling price (see
Figure 4). You confirm the ask by a click on the button. The ask is then added
to the list of outstanding asks. The outstanding asks are publicly recorded in
increasing order, i.e. the best outstanding ask (the cheapest proposed selling
price) being placed at the top of the list. All market participants can see this
list.
Note: you can submit as many asks as you like to sell one share. Upon selling
one share, all your outstanding asks (for that share class) are cancelled. To sell
another share of that share class, you then must submit a new ask.
2. Submit a BID: A bid is a proposed buying price for one share. You bid to
purchase a share by entering your bidding price for one share in the space
underneath the button BID: proposed buying price. You confirm your bid by
a click on the button. The bid is then added to the list of outstanding bids.
The outstanding bids are publicly recorded in decreasing order, i.e., the best
outstanding bid (highest proposed purchase price) being placed at the top of
the list. All market participants can see this list.
Note: If two or more orders (bids or asks) are the same, they are listed in the
order of arrival, earlier orders being given priority over later ones. Upon pur-
chasing one share, all your outstanding bids (for that share class) are cancelled.
To buy another share for this share class you then must submit a new bid.
3. Immediate BUY – accept an ask: The best outstanding ask of the other market
participants is marked on your screen. You can accept the asking price (i.e.,
entering in a purchase agreement of a share with the seller) by clicking the
button Immediate BUY, which is placed at the bottom of the list of outstanding
asks.
4. Immediate SELL – accept a bid: The best outstanding bid of the other market
participants is marked. You can accept the bid (i.e., entering in a sale agree-
ment of a share with the buyer) by clicking on the button Immediate SELL,
which is placed at the bottom of the list of outstanding bids.
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Figure 4: Trading screen
5. Delete – you can delete your outstanding bids and asks. To do so, select your
outstanding bid or ask, which are displayed in the list in blue colour and click
the button Delete.
Note: Your own orders are displayed in blue, while the other orders are visible
to you in black. You cannot accept your own orders. You cannot delete orders
of others. You cannot purchase shares if the ask exceeds your cash plus credit
line. If your holding of “A” shares is -5, you cannot sell any further “A” shares.
If your holding of “B” shares is -5, you cannot sell any further “B” shares.
A.3 Transaction and price announcement
Upon acceptance of a bid or ask, via Immediate BUY or Immediate SELL, a trans-
action is completed. The accepted order is the transaction price. The transaction
price is recorded on your screen in between the lists of bids and asks. Next to the
price you are informed if you participated as buyer or seller in the transaction. The
more recent prices are listed first. The most recent prices are also recorded for each
share class in the middle of the screen below the cash amount.
Upon transacting, the price is debited from the buyer’s cash balance and credited
to the seller’s cash balance. The purchased share is added to the buyer’s share
holdings and subtracted from the seller’s share holding.
Note: Immediately after these instructions, you are going to participate in a
Practice Session of trading to familiarize yourself with the trading environment. You
trade for 3 minutes on your screen with the other participants. There are NO payoff
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consequences linked to trading in the Practice Session. During the Practice Session
please practice submissions of bids and asks, immediate selling and buying, and
deleting of your outstanding bids and asks. You may want to practice selling more
shares than you own to end up with a negative share count. You may also want to
practice buying more shares than you can pay with your own money to end up with
a negative cash balance. During the Practice Session none of your actions will have
any payoff consequences. The payoff-relevant trading periods begin only after the
Practice Session.
A.4 Information
You will receive real-time updates on bids, asks and prices for both share classes
“A” and “B”. Information regarding the two share classes are given on the screen
on the left-hand and on the right-hand side, respectively. You will receive summary
information about the prices at opening of the period, the high, the low and the
average price during the period.
In each period, you will be reminded on screen about the remaining future div-
idends, and the possible liquidation payments at the end of the round. Finally, the
realized past dividends are shown. The latest paid out dividend of the prior period
is highlighted.
The experimenter recorded the order of the 4 dividends on sheets of paper. Then,
the experimenter put the paper into an envelope, which was placed on the wall. At
the conclusion of the experiment, the experimenter will show the list of predetermined
dividends to confirm they match the dividends observed during the market. You will
have a record of your dividend sequence at the final screen. You will be able to
compare the dividend sequence on your screen with the predetermined dividends at
that time.
The past prices are shown in a table on the bottom of the screen, including
the prices at opening, closing, the high, low and average of each past period. Al-
ternatively to the past prices, you receive past information on your share and cash
holdings at the end of the period, buys and sells during a period, and the past period
dividends. You can alternate the past information with the past prices by clicking
on the button.
A.5 Endowment and earnings
Your earnings in this experiment will be based on your final cash balances which
include Cash holdings as well as liquidation payments for A and B shares at the end
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of a round.
Note: If you have negative Cash holdings after the final period of a round, the
amount you borrowed will be subtracted from the total liquidation payment of your
shares. If you have negative share holdings, the liquidation payment of the shares
you borrowed will be subtracted from your Cash holdings.
The final cash balance of one of the six rounds will be paid out to you at the
end of the experiment. The round to be paid out is chosen randomly. The result
of this random draw has been determined before the session, and has been recorded
on a sheet of paper in the envelope on the wall, which will be revealed to you after
the final round. You will also be informed about the decisive round on the screen to
confirm that the two numbers match.
At the end of the experiment, cash units (CU) will be converted to Euro, at an
exchange rate of 1 = 300 CU. Your final payment will be equal to your final cash
balance at the end of the decisive round plus a 5 payment for your participation. The
final payment will be made to you in private; you will receive an envelope delivered
to your seat in exchange for your signed receipt.
A.6 Trading algorithm
Besides the participants in the room, a computerized trading algorithm may partic-
ipate in the market. The computerized algorithm can take the same actions as you,
that is, it can buy and sell in the market. The details of the strategy followed by
the algorithm are not revealed to you, and you will not be informed whether the
computerized trading algorithm actually acts in the market or not.
A.7 Summary
1. You will be given an initial 4000 units of cash, 5 “A” shares, and 5 “B” shares
at the beginning of each round. Over the course of a round, each A-share
and each “B” share pays the owner a dividend of either +50, or -50. Exactly
two dividend payments of each share are positive (+50) and two dividends are
negative (-50).
2. At the end of the round, each share pays a liquidation payment. The liquidation
payment per A-share is either 100 (if the flip of the coin is heads) or 300 cash
units (if the flip of the coin is tails). The liquidation payment per B share is
200 cash units more; that is: 300 (if the flip of the coin is heads) or 500 cash
units (if the flip of the coin is tails).
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3. In each period the market will be open for trading, 180 seconds in the first two
rounds and 120 seconds in later rounds. You can submit offers to BUY shares
and offers to SELL shares. You can make immediate transactions by buying
at the lowest ask (offer to sell) or selling at the highest bid (offer to buy). You
can delete your offers while outstanding.
4. You will participate in 6 rounds of 4 periods. At the end of the experiment, one
round of four periods is selected for payment. The decisive round is determined
randomly and is recorded on a sheet of paper in an envelope on taped to the
wall, which will be revealed to you after the final round. The decisive round is
the same for all participants in a market of eight.
5. Note that if you borrow cash or shares you may end a round with a negative
cash balance. If a round is chosen for payment in which you incur losses, you
will earn nothing.
6. A computerized trading algorithm may participate in the market. However,
you will never be told whether the algorithm acts in the market and, if it does,
what it is programmed to do.
7. The instructions are over. If you have any question, raise your hand and consult
the monitor. Otherwise, please wait for the following Practice Session of three
minutes.
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B Additional figures and tables
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Figure 5: DPPt by L sequence
The different sequences of dividends were as follows. Sequence 1: -50,-50,50,50,
Sequence 2: -50,50,-50,50, Sequence 3: -50,50,50,-50, Sequence 4: 50,-50,-50,50, Se-
quence 5: 50,-50,50,-50, Sequence 6: 50,50,-50,-50. The dotted line ”0” indicates
parity pricing.
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Table 8: Relative and absolute mispricing. OLS regressions for relative and rel-
ative absolute period-level deviations from fundamental values with robust standard
errors. RADU,L,t and RDU,L,t are averages of values for L-shares and U-shares.
Dependent variable:
RADU,L,t RDU,L,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.294∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ −0.066 −0.228∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.051) (0.066) (0.043) (0.079) (0.105)
Bot 0.010 −0.009 0.020 −0.091∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.052
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034)
TwoUrn −0.010 −0.014 −0.024 0.037 0.035 0.109∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
Market −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
avRisk −0.030∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022)
avFemale 0.245∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗
(0.034) (0.058) (0.062) (0.099)
avCRT −0.005 −0.001
(0.040) (0.054)
Observations 192 192 144 192 192 144
R2 0.042 0.170 0.233 0.063 0.121 0.191
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.148 0.200 0.048 0.097 0.156
F Statistic 2.714∗∗ 7.627∗∗∗ 6.950∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 5.124∗∗∗ 5.401∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
34
